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Abstract 
 
The transition from socialism to capitalism has spawned a large literature on 
comparative policy reforms. While many sociologists using qualitative data have 
concluded that neo-liberal reforms led to negative outcomes, a large body of cross-
national literature, mostly from economics and political science, claims that more 
neo-liberal reforms produced better economic and political outcomes. These latter 
studies almost all use measures of policy reform constructed by economists at the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). We show, using the 
EBRD’s own data, that their indices of progress in market reforms are biased in the 
direction of positive growth. That is, the EBRD’s bureaucracy over-codes the more 
successful countries. When one accounts for this bias, the relationship between the 
EBRD’s transition indicators and growth significantly weakens or disappears. These 
findings have implications for social scientific research using statistics constructed by  
international organizations, like the World Bank and the IMF.    
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Introduction 
  
Cross-national analysis relying on policy indices created by international 
policy institutions, such as the World Bank, Heritage Foundation and Freedom House, 
have become mainstream in macro-analysis in sociology, political science and 
economics. These statistics crucially inform debates about the appropriate policies for 
promoting economic and political development, including those on property rights 
(Acemoglu et al 2001; Levine 2005), corruption (Mauro 1995; Mo 2001; Barro 1991), 
governance (Kaufmann et al 2003) and democracy (Lee 2005; Paxton 2002; Wejnert 
2005; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2004; Ross 2006). Yet, as sociologists, we recognize the 
intimate relation between power and knowledge (Foucault 1980) and the universal, 
but hidden, possibility that those who construct these statistics could introduce bias in 
the direction of power, which could greatly affect the outcomes being studied.  
Although previous work has questioned the validity of some policy indices as 
analytical constructs (Kurtz and Schrank 2007) and their potential for measuring 
underlying government choices rather than just the actual policy (Rodrik 2005), to our 
knowledge no study has successfully tested for bias per se in their construction (i.e., 
in the statistic-generating process). What has restricted previous efforts has been the 
lack of ‘gold-standard’, or actual data on policy implementation for comparison with 
the codings by the policy institutions. Usually, because these institutions have the 
advantage of greater access to the data, and in many cases a complete monopoly on 
the resources for research, any policy data underlying the statistics are often not easily 
reproducible or kept secret (e.g., World Bank Governance Indicators or IMF Index of 
Conditionality Implementation).  
Both methodologically and substantively, we plan to assess this potential for 
bias in the statistics produced by international financial institutions (IFIs) on one of 
the most profound economic experiments of our time: the transitions from state-
socialism to capitalism in eastern Europe during the 1990’s. At no other period in 
modern history have so many radical and widely contested economic reforms been 
imposed so quickly on societies. From the outset of transition, intellectuals agreed 
upon the need for reform but disputed the appropriate pace and scale of liberalization 
(the “Shock Therapy versus Gradualism” debate) (Sachs 1990; Stiglitz 1999). IFIs, 
particularly the World Bank and IMF, played crucial roles in both legitimating and 
evaluating the neo-liberal ‘Shock Therapy’ platform (Wedel 2001; Gowan 1999). As 
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the principal monitors and evaluators of transition policies, these institutions could be 
considered “global knowledge agencies”, to emphasize their roles in producing 
knowledge for policymakers and academics (Toye and Toye 2005). 
One of the most important knowledge agencies during transition was the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), a bank established to 
support ex-communist countries administratively and financially during transition. 
Since 1994, the EBRD has constructed an annual Transition Indicator database to 
“provide an understanding of how, why and by what means transition policies have 
related to economic growth and social development” (EBRD 1994: 9). These statistics 
– the ‘ultimate’ documents for studying transition (Dejak 2005: 49) – have been used 
by many prominent social scientists, including Åslund (2007), Fischer (2000), Lane 
(2006), Sachs (1996), and Stiglitz (2006).  
Most quantitative analysis, drawing heavily upon the EBRD’s Transition 
Indicator statistics1, has identified positive effects of the rapid approach (e.g., Sachs 
1996; Fischer and Sahay 2000; de Melo et al 1996). Yet, a large body of work by 
global ethnographers and qualitative researchers has consistently found negative 
outcomes in connection with these policies (e.g., Burawoy 2000; Southworth 2004). 
These conflicting findings between the qualitative and quantitative methods remain 
unresolved (Popov 2000; Popov 2007). 
Could part of the differences in findings between methods be a result of bias in 
the statistics used in these quantitative analyses? Or, are the reform indexes 
constructed by the EBRD biased? Indeed, as advisors, financers and surveyors of 
market reforms, the EBRD’s bureaucracy had both incentives and ample opportunities 
for self-fulfilling codings.2  
The EBRD’s coverage of transition policies offers a rare opportunity to 
measure this potential bias. It has produced, alongside its Transition Indicator dataset, 
a Transition Report text series. These detailed texts, released annually, contain 
                                                 
1 Virtually every large cross-national analysis of transition has relied upon the statistics produced by 
the EBRD for measuring progress in market reform. 
 
2 First, the EBRD’s conflicting roles as both advisor and evaluator create incentives for their analysts to 
factor economic growth into their measures of the implementation of their preferred policies. Self-
fulfilling codings would be possible because the construction of statistics takes place after country 
performance has been observed, as Merlevede and Schoors (2004) point out. Secondly, the EBRD 
promotes a particular ideology, representing a neo-liberal version of contemporary capitalism, that 
emphasizes deregulation and privatization. This disposition might also create unconscious ideological 
bias among officers of the EBRD bureaucracy.  
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extensive quantitative information on actual progress in transition policies for 29 ex-
communist countries. In this study, we have compiled a ‘gold-standard’ dataset on 
transition policies from the quantitative data reported in the text of the EBRD’s 
transition reports. We then tested for systematic deviations between these actual data 
and the statistics constructed by EBRD’s bureaucracy. 
The rest of this article is as follows: In the first two sections, we briefly review 
the social and intellectual context of transition as well as the few existing studies that 
have attempted to evaluate potential bias in the statistics produced by IFIs. In the third 
section, we describe how we collected our ‘gold-standard’ data for assessing bias in 
the EBRD’s statistics. In the fourth section we show the results of several diagnostic 
tests of deviations between actual data on reform and the statistics constructed by the 
EBRD. In the fifth we re-visit the analysis of transition policies on economic growth, 
after correcting for potential coding biases. We conclude by noting the limitations of 
this work, but by arguing that it has implications for the unresolved “Shock Therapy 
versus Gradualism” debate and more generally for studies relying upon statistics 
constructed by IFIs and other policy institutions, such as the World Bank, IMF, and 
the Heritage Foundation. 
 
Social and Intellectual Context of Transition Reforms 
A small group of neo-liberal economists at a handful of major research 
universities and within the EBRD, IMF and World Bank provided both intellectual 
guidance and legitimacy for politicians pushing neoliberal transition policies. These 
neo-liberals argued that a successful transition to capitalism from communism 
required three sets of policies to be undertaken as rapidly as possible: mass 
privatization, liberalization of prices and trade, and stabilization programmes. If these 
policies were not extensively and rapidly undertaken, it was argued, capitalism might 
never be successfully reached, which risked a return to state socialism (Åslund 2007). 
In the short-run, these reforms were predicted to be painful for Soviet workers and 
managers, but in the long-run they were argued to boost economic growth and lead to 
convergence with western capitalist economies.  
Given these social and intellectual stakes, and the disastrous outcomes that 
were already apparent already in the early 1990’s, the EBRD faced clear incentives to 
classify the more successful countries as having achieved faster progress in 
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implementing the controversial neoliberal reforms. But if the EBRD’s bureaucracy 
was biased, and this bias worked its way into the statistics, how would we know? 
 
Evaluating Bias in the Statistics Produced by Global Knowledge Agencies 
The few existing studies that have attempted to investigate the possibility that 
International Financial Institutions (IFI) ‘build success’ into their statistics and 
analysis have centred on the World Bank. Banerjee et al (2006) assessed the work of 
the World Bank over a twenty year period and noted that research methods were often 
used without adequate rigor, and economic models were simply ‘tinkered with’ to 
provide justification for World Bank policies. More recent work by Kurtz and 
Schrank (2007) evaluated the World Bank’s coding of ‘good governance’ by 
exploiting the time-dimension in their data. Using granger-style causality tests, they 
investigated whether higher governance scores preceded or followed the Bank’s 
desired economic outcomes. Kurtz and Schrank found weak support for the notion 
that better governance, as measured by the World Bank, was connected with 
successive improvements in growth. Instead, they found that the perception-based 
codings of policies were biased by ‘halo effects’ of prior growth, such that greater 
past growth correlated significantly with higher governance ratings in future periods 
but higher past governance ratings were uncorrelated with successive growth.  
The postcommunist economies provide a rare opportunity for testing the 
potential for bias in the basic statistical measures developed for evaluating policy 
success and failure. The EBRD constructed a set of measures of progress in market 
policies on the basis of a raw set of transition policy data. By closely reviewing the 
pieces of raw data reported in the EBRD’s Transition Report series and World Bank 
Europe and Central Asia privatization database, we have been able to compare the 
data on progress in market reform, which were available to the EBRD at the time of 
coding, with their constructed statistics, which are relied upon by the rest of the 
intellectual community. Therefore, despite the usual monopoly by IFIs on information 
faced by academics, we have been able to evaluate the relationship between the 
underlying economic data and the codings of economic progress produced by the 
EBRD. 
 
Data and Methods 
 6
Our analysis of the potential bias in the EBRD statistics focuses on the two 
most crucial economic reforms: privatization and liberalization. 3 The EBRD has 
constructed four indices measuring progress in these areas for twenty nine 
postcommunist countries: a small-scale index privatization, a large-scale index of 
privatization, a price liberalization index, and a foreign exchange and trade 
liberalization index. These indices scale from 1 (planned economy) to 4+ (advanced 
market economy), and move in increments of approximately 0.3 units (see Table 1 for 
more details).  Of the two liberalisation indices, we focused only on price 
liberalisation, because index on foreign exchange and trade liberalisation index 
attempted to collapse two policies into one dimension, and because the relationship 
between foreign trade liberalization and quantitative measures of such liberalization, 
like average tariff levels, was much lower (r=.33?).This could also be due to the 
difficulty in quantifying barriers to trade.    
 [Table 1 about here] 
These indices explicitly include subjective judgements about progress in 
transition by the EBRD staff (EBRD 1996; EBRD 2007)4: "Transition indicator 
scores reflect the judgment of the EBRD's Office of the Chief Economist about 
country-specific progress in transition." (EBRD 2009). Analysts at the EBRD note 
further that “the hardest conceptual issues concern the definition and measurement of 
reform. Any attempt to assign numbers to a country’s progress in transition is 
inherently difficult and carries a large degree of subjectivity” (Falcetti, Lysenko and 
Sanfey 2005: 6).   
The EBRD codings of progress in reform could thus be decomposed into three 
parts: actual progress in market policies, subjective bias, and measurement error. 
To measure “actual progress in market policies”, we have compiled the data 
sources available to the EBRD by compiling the data published in their Transition 
Report Series. This ‘gold standard’ dataset allows us to evaluate the validity of the 
                                                 
3 A third, stabilization programmes, was viewed as necessary to suppress inflationary pressures and 
ensure markets provided the right information in the form of stable prices. However, specific indices 
for this policy are not included in the Transition Indicator statistical database. 
 
4 In personal communication with an EBRD economist, we were told on occasion   a team of analysts 
would sit down with the economic data to discuss country progress in implementing market reforms 
and then decide the appropriate coding. 
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EBRD indices.5  To improve our sample size, we have enriched our set with data 
from the World Bank’s Europe and Central Asia Privatization Database and cou
specific sources, which were available to the EBRD when constructing their statistics 
(see Appendix 1 for all sources). None of our basic results was affected by this step. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of our dataset. 
ntry-
                                                
[Table 2 about here] 
 As sceptical observers, we might ask ourselves: what if we, too, may have 
incorporated subjective bias in our statistics? We collected only the quantitative data 
that would have also been available to the EBRD at the time of coding the indices, 
and the majority of the data is directly taken from EBRD sources that were published 
in the Transition Report series alongside the Transition Indicator database. Any bias 
in our data would thus only reproduce the biases in the existing data on policy 
implementation.6 This feature of our data enables us to distinguish the potential biases 
introduced by the EBRD’s bureaucracy from those introduced in reports from 
government agencies to the EBRD. 
 If there were no systematic bias in the EBRD’s construction of statistics, any 
differences between the EBRD’s coding of the policy and the underlying policy data 
should register as random measurement error. Thus, in a simple model regressing the 
EBRD policy on the underlying policy data, or EBRD Policy Index = βActual Policy 
Outcome + ε, we should find that the measurement error, or ε, should be normally 
distributed and vary similarly across the actual progress in market reforms. 
 
Hypothesis #1: Differences between EBRD coding of market reforms and actual 
reforms are random 
 
Conditional on rejecting hypothesis #1, we tested whether factors relevant to the 
EBRD, such as growth in economic output, might explain why some countries were 
over- or under-coded. 
 
5 As one of many possible examples, in describing Armenia’s progress in privatization, the country 
assessments in the EBRD Transition Report series notes: 1994: large-scale privatization begins; 1995: 
1,100 medium- and large-scale (MLSE) enterprises were converted to joint stock companies in 1995. 
1996: a further 626 MSLE firms were privatized. 1997: 88.4% of all firms had been privatized, with an 
additional 650 expected to be privatized by the end of the year.  
6 Only one source of measurement error should exist between the EBRD’s Transition Indicator 
statistics and the data reported in the Transition Report texts. The EBRD staff backdated a very small 
number of their codings in the Transition Indicator series in cases when more accurate information was 
subsequently released.  
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 Hypothesis #2: EBRD is more likely to code progress in market reform as greater 
than it actually is when the economy grows  
 
 
Results 
To what extent is actual progress in market reforms captured in the EBRD’s 
codings?  Correlations between the actual policy and EBRD’s coded variables were 
strong for privatization and liberalization (small-scale r = 0.90, large-scale r= 0.87, 
price liberalization r = 0.80). That is, about 83% of the variations in the EBRD’s 
small-scale privatization index, 76% in the EBRD’s large-scale privatization index 
and 64% in the EBRD’s price liberalization index can be explained by the actual 
policies.7  
[Figure 1 about here] 
 Although there is a strong correspondence between the actual and constructed 
data, the EBRD’s scoring criteria appear out of sync with their corresponding policy 
values. As shown in Table 3, a 3 on the EBRD large-scale privatization index denotes 
at least 25% of state-owned enterprise assets privatized and a 4 denotes at least 50% 
privatized. Yet, figure 1, plotting the average relationship between the EBRD indices 
and actual progress in reform, reveals a 3 corresponds to a 62.5% privatized on 
average, when such progress should, on average, have met the criteria for a 4 scoring. 
Large variations occur across these codings: Armenia in 1998 and Moldova in 1997 
had privatized 70% and 66% of their large-state owned enterprise assets, which 
should have qualified as a 4, yet the EBRD coded them both as a 3. On the other 
hand, Macedonia had only reached about 20% in 1996 and Poland less than 15% in 
1994, but these countries were both coded as a 3. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 For price liberalization, an unusual situation occurred where the EBRD 
claimed little or no progress had been made in moving from a ‘planned economy’ to a 
‘market economy’ in their Transition Report, when their Transition Indicators 
showed the opposite (see Appendix 2). In 2003, Ukraine had state controls remaining 
on 6 out of 15 goods in the EBRD’s basket for post-Soviet economies. This was 
                                                 
7 The EBRD’s constructed indices poorly reflected year-to-year progress in economic reform. When 
evaluating the first-differences versions of these variables, the R2 drop to 0.36 for small-scale 
privatization, 0.13for large-scale privatization and 0.16 for price liberalization.  
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assigned a score of a 4 on the EBRD price liberalization index, or the standard of an 
advanced market economy. Ukraine’s neighbouring country Belarus, on the other 
hand, which was criticized by some for being exceptionally slow – “a Soviet theme 
park” (Åslund 2001) –had state controls on only four out of 15 of these goods but was 
given a 2.7 score. 
 Such coding discrepancies lead to confusion which manifests in, for example, 
the debates among policy advisors about which countries have followed their policy 
advice. The debate has been most heated for comparing Russia and Poland. Was 
Russia, a relatively disastrous case, or Poland, a more successful country, the 
archetype of the rapid approach to market reforms (so-called “Shock Therapy”)? 
The EBRD indices provide little help in resolving this debate. For example, on 
large-scale privatization, arguably the most controversial transition policy, according 
to the EBRD Transition Indicator data, these countries were nearly indistinguishable 
with regard to their progress. By 1994, both Russia and Poland had a coding of 3, and 
by 1997, these countries advanced to a 3.3. 
 But the actual policy data reported in the text of the EBRD Transition Report 
series reveal a clearer picture of the paths taken. By 1994, Poland had privatized less 
than 15% of their large-scale state owned firms, falling just below the threshold for a 
3 in the EBRD index. Russia had privatized roughly three-quarters of their large state-
owned enterprise assets, which should have far exceeded the EBRD’s criteria for a 4. 
Yet, the EBRD gave both countries the same score of 3. Between 1996 and 1997, 
Poland gained another 0.3 points when the country had privatized 45% of large state 
enterprises. Russia by this point had transferred almost all state enterprise assets to 
private owners, but was again assigned the same score as Poland.  
 
Diagnostic Tests of Coding Errors 
 
  Are these discrepancies between actual policy and the EBRD’s constructed 
statistics random mistakes?  
We tested whether the differences between the underlying data on actual 
progress in market reforms and their associated scoring on the EBRD index was 
consistent with random measurement error. Two quantitative criteria of random errors 
were assessed: that the errors were normally distributed and that their variability was 
constant.  
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To test whether the deviations between actual policy and the EBRD codings in 
our basic models appeared to be random, we analyzed residual plots and applied 
standard quantitative methods, a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and a Breusch-Pagan 
test for constant variance. In all cases, the quantitative tests strongly reject the 
normality (p<0.001) and constant variance (p<0.001) of these discrepancies, which 
were consistent findings with those graphically depicted in the residual plots (see 
Appendix 3).  
Ruling out that the EBRD’s coding errors were not simply random does not 
prove subjective bias, but it does provide further evidence that EBRD’s process of 
measuring progress in market reforms was markedly inconsistent.  
 
Determinants of Coding Errors 
Next we tested whether these discrepancies were systematic. That is, could the 
errors be explained by factors other than the EBRD’s criteria? Because the EBRD’s 
principal measure of success was economic growth, we evaluated the relationship 
between the coding deviations and several measures of economic performance. 
 [Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 shows the results of fifteen regressions of the residual of the basic 
model on multiple measures of economic performance. While not all measures of 
economic performance were statistically significant predictors of over- or under-
coding, faster growing economies generally received higher scores of progress in 
privatization. Both Poland and Macedonia, which had their progress in large-scale 
privatization significantly over-coded, were among the top-5 growth performers. 
Among the measures of economic we tested, the most important correlate of coding 
deviations was economic growth in the preceding year. 
  
Robustness Checks 
Before proceeding, we performed a series of checks to our specification, 
sample and explanatory variables. First, we replicated all of our analysis using only 
within-country changes in the policy variables. None of the results was different, 
although in some cases the estimated biases were weaker than the models using full-
variation, suggesting that the potential bias may have related to analysts picking 
favourite ‘neoliberal’ top-performing countries. Second, we deleted potential outlying 
values based on a conservative cutoff of two standard deviations. Although the 
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connection between the EBRD indices and the raw policy data improved to r = 0.84 
for large-scale and r = 0.95 for small-scale, the basic issues persisted.  
Next, we considered some alternative explanations. We tested whether a 
country’s membership in the former Soviet Union might have been an important 
factor, which may be indicative of a western bias. We found that the core Soviet 
countries, such as Russia and Kazakhstan, were coded on average -0.32 points lower 
(or were 27% more likely to be undercoded) than satellite countries, such as Czech 
Republic and Hungary, in the EBRD’s small-scale privatization index, after holding 
constant these countries’ level of progress in small-scale privatization.   
Lastly, we tested reliable data on mortality rates, which Sen (1998) argues is 
an important alternative measure of economic success and failure and would arguably 
not have been an explicit factor in the EBRD’s analysts’ construction of statistics. We 
found that trends in mortality, measured in a variety of ways (life expectancy at birth 
for men and women, heart disease mortality rates, suicide rates), had no effect on 
deviations in coding across countries.  
Returning to our hypotheses, we find strong evidence that the deviations 
between the EBRD’s constructed statistics of country progress in market reforms and 
the underlying data on these reforms are not simply mistakes, or random measurement 
errors (hypothesis 1). These deviations appear systematic with regard to economic 
performance (hypothesis 2), the principal measure of success and failure being studied 
by the EBRD.  
 
Re-evaluating the links between growth and market reform 
Does the institutional bias in the construction of statistics have implications 
for previous analyses of growth and market reform? 
We revisited some basic models of the effects on growth of large-scale 
privatization, the most contentious transition policy and index for which the bias was 
the greatest. First, we reproduced findings that progress in large-scale privatization is 
connected with higher growth in real GDP per capita (standard errors in parentheses, 
n = 108): 
 
(1a) Growth = -9.02 + 3.89 EBRD Large-Scale Privatization, 
       (3.59) (1.91, p = 0.045) 
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Then, we ran our models using the raw large-scale privatization data: 
(1b) Growth = -4.83 + 0.05 Percentage of Large-Scale Firms Privatized   
  (2.95) (0.07, p = 0.485) 
 
Once the institutional bias is removed, the positive growth effect of large-scale 
privatization disappears.  While it is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the 
complex links between reforms and growth, these simple equations suggest that many 
cross-national studies using the EBRD’s statistics have potentially substantially 
overstated the links between neo-liberal reforms and positive outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Before evaluating the importance of our findings we must address their 
limitations. First, our ‘gold-standard’ data on market reforms potentially incorporates 
bias from the domestic agencies which reported data to the EBRD. However, this 
enables us to pinpoint the bias introduced in the construction of statistics, while 
avoiding the difficult assessments about actual progress in market reforms during 
capitalist transition. Second, economic data are known to be unreliable in 
postcommunist countries, and the EBRD strongly cautions against their use for the 
early 1990’s. But no matter how inaccurate these economic data may have been, they 
could have played a role in statistic-generating process. Not the least for these two 
reasons, we have not attempted in this paper to establish a ‘truer’ relationship between 
transition reforms and economic success. 
 Our analysis has shown that one major global knowledge agency, the EBRD, 
has systematically built economic success into its statistics of progress in market 
reforms. The longstanding, and as yet unresolved, debate on the quantitative effects of 
neo-liberal reforms has thus been, to some extent, rigged from the outset. These 
findings call into question hundreds of studies which have relied on Transition 
Indicator data for studying economic and social outcomes, as any findings will be 
identified in part by a significant institutional bias. Understanding differences in the 
extent to which studies have successfully corrected for self-fulfilling codings may 
help resolve the conflicting statistical findings about the effects of the neo-liberal 
approaches to capitalism. 
 We cannot rule out the possibility that this institutional bias operated sub-
consciously or at the level of habitus among the EBRD bureaucracy, although we 
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found that the measures of economic success of focal interest to the EBRD, and the 
associated global financial elite, were strongly connected with over-coding successful 
countries but that other generalized measures of social welfare, such as mortality data, 
were not.  
 While the World Bank is to be applauded for allowing independent audits of 
some of their work, other global knowledge agencies, including the IMF and the 
EBRD, now need to follow suit, especially because these institutions receive public 
funding and claim legitimately to promote the public good. Theoretically, our work 
provides a further piece of modern empirical support for theorists such as Foucault on 
the intimate relations between knowledge (in this case statistics) and power (the neo-
liberal hegemony). Scientifically, our findings issue a note of caution for those relying 
upon socially constructed policy indices for cross-national analysis. 
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Figure 1a. Relationship between Actual Policy and EBRD Policy Indices 
 
Small-Scale Privatization 
1
2
3
4
E
BR
D
 S
m
al
l-S
ca
le
 P
riv
at
iz
at
io
n 
In
de
x
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
  
Percentage of Small-Scale Firms Privatized
Small-Scale Privatization
 
Figure 1b. Relationship between Actual Policy and EBRD Policy Indices 
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Figure 1c. Relationship between Actual Policy and EBRD Policy Indices 
 
Price Liberalization 
 
1
2
3
4
E
BR
D
 P
ric
e 
Li
be
ra
liz
at
io
n 
In
de
x
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
 
Percentage of Prices Liberalized
Price Liberalization
 
 
Table 1. Description of European Bank for Reconstruction & Development 
Capitalist Transition Indicators 
 
Table 1. Description of European Bank for Reconstruction & Development Capitalist Transition Indicators 
Market Reform EBRD Description of Coding 
EBRD Small-Scale 
Privatization Index† 
1   Little progress 
2   Substantial share privatized 
3   Comprehensive program almost ready for implementation 
4   Complete privatization of small companies with tradable ownership rights 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state ownership 
of small enterprises; effective tradability of land 
EBRD Large-Scale 
Privatization Index† 
1   Little private ownership 
2   Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed 
3   More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of 
being privatized (with the process having reached a stage at which the state has effectively 
ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate 
governance 
4   More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and 
significant progress on corporate governance of these enterprises 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75 
percent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance 
EBRD Price 
Liberalization Index† 
1   Most prices formally controlled by government 
2   Price controls for several important categories; state procurement at non-market prices     
remains substantial  
3   Substantial progress on price liberalisation: state procurement at non-market prices      
largely phased out 
4   Comprehensive price liberalisation; utility pricing which reflects economic costs 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies; comprehensive price 
liberalisation; efficiency-enhancing regulation of utility pricing 
Note: Data are scaled from 1 (planned economy) to 4.3 (advanced market economy. Definitions are quoted directly 
from the EBRD Transition Report series, available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/sci.xls. The 
indices have remained largely unchanged since 1994 and have been backdated so that they assess the extent of 
transition from 1989 to the present. The EBRD website notes that, "Transition indicator scores reflect the judgment 
of the EBRD's Office of the Chief Economist about country-specific progress in transition" (EBRD 2009).  
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptives of ‘Gold-Standard’ Dataset 
 
Table 2. Descriptives of Actual Policy Variables 
Variable Name Definition Obs 
Mean 
(Std. Dev) 
Min Max 
Small Scale 
Privatization 
Percentage of small scale 
enterprises privatized 
405 
69.16% 
(39.41) 
0% 100% 
Large Scale 
Privatization 
Percentage of large scale 
enterprises privatized 
131 
23.31% 
(31.55) 
0% 98.26%
Price Liberalization 
Percentage of State-controlled 
Prices liberalized in EBRD-15* 
432 
72.33% 
(28.06) 
0% 100% 
Note: * EBRD-15 is a basket of goods that includes 15 key consumer goods such as milk, 
bread, gasoline and transportation costs. Web Appendix 1 further describes sources of data. 
 
 
Table 3. Relationships between EBRD Constructed Indices and Actual Data on 
Market Reform 
 
EBRD Reform Index 
Actual Market Reform Data Small Scale 
Privatization 
Large Scale 
Privatization
Price  
Liberalization 
Percentage of Small 
Enterprises Privatized 
0.027*** 
(0.00006) — — 
Percentage of Large 
Enterprises Privatized — 
0.028** 
(0.001) — 
Percentage of Prices 
liberalizeda — — 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
Constant 1.369*** (0.050) 
1.254*** 
(0.054) 
1.441*** 
(0.081) 
R2 0.825 0.763 0.644 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. a – prices liberalized are based on a bundle of 15 
goods selected by the EBRD, including food and transportation. Similar results were found 
when specifying the constant to equal 1, or the ‘planned economy’ stage of the EBRD 
coding. 
*- p<0.05  ** - p<0.01 ***- p<0.001  
 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Deviations between Actual Reform Data and Constructed EBRD 
Indices 
 
Table 4. Determinants of Deviations between Actual Reform Data and Constructed EBRD Indices
Measure of Economic Success Small-Scale Privatization 
Large-Scale 
Privatization 
Price 
Liberalization 
0.13** 0.45*** 0.21*** Positive Growth in Previous Year  (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) 
-0.01 -0.03** 0.05 Negative Growth in Previous Year (-0.06) 0.09) (0.07) 
Previous Level of Log GDP per capita 0.18*** (0.03) 
0.13 
(0.08) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
‘Top 5’ Average growth, 1991-1996  0.18** (0.06) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
0.22**  
(0.07) 
‘Worst 5’ Average growth, 1991-1996 -0.29*** (0.06) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
0.07  
(0.07) 
Notes: Coefficients presented from 15 models regressing the residual of the first-step model, EBRD Policy Index = α + 
βActual Policy + ε, on measures of GDP. Growth based on trends in GDP per capita in current USD. Standard errors in 
parentheses.  
*p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
Web Appendix 1. Data Sources and Sample 
 
Small- and Large-Scale Privatization 
 
Data on privatization are taken from the quantitative data reported in the text of the EBRD 
Transition Report series. We included quantitative data from the World Bank Europe and 
central Asia Privatization Database. For Albania, data points from AlbInvest, the state 
privatization agency, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe, were included. For 
Bulgaria, data from the Bulgarian privatization agency were included. For Lativa, data were 
taken from World Bank authors Soo Im and colleagues 1993, Privatization in the republics of 
the former Soviet Union: Framework and initial results, page 48, as part of the World Bank 
Private Sector Development and Privatization group. 
 
Price Liberalization 
 
All price liberalization data were taken from the EBRD. The main source was the text 
descriptions of progress in liberalizing prices out of the 15 goods tracked by the 
EBRD(flour/bread, meat, milk, gasoline/petrol, cotton textiles, shoes, paper, cars, television 
sets, cement, steel, coal, wood, rents, inter-city bus service). In cases of missing data, we 
included the raw data from the EBRD Structural and Institutional Change Data, found in the 
EBRD Transition Indicators Database. 
 
Sample 
 
Countries included in the sample were: 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. 
 
 
Web Appendix 2. Data points coded as 1, or no progress, by EBRD, despite 
significant actual price liberalization 
 
Country 
Year 
Percentage of prices 
liberalized in EBRD-15 
basket  
Belarus 1991 60.00. 
Bulgaria 1990 20.00 
Kazakhstan 1991 66.67 
Kyrgyzstan 1991 66.67 
Moldova 1989 26.67 
Moldova 1990 26.67 
Moldova 1991 26.67 
Romania 1990 6.67 
Turkmenistan 1989 46.67 
Turkmenistan 1990 46.67 
Turkmenistan 1991 46.67 
Turkmenistan 1992 53.33 
Turkmenistan 1993 60.00 
Ukraine 1992 40.00 
Ukraine 1993 40.00 
 
 
As an example of these mismatches, we spotlight two cases: Ukraine in 1992/1993 
and Belarus in 1991 
 
Ukraine 
Source #1: EBRD Transition Report Text 
1994 – “Price regulations have intensified since start of 1992, after price liberalisation 
in 1991” 
1995 – “Comprehensive Reform programme was introduced in 1994. Before this 
period, pervasive price controls through whole economy. Majority removed with a 
few in monopolies. Further price adjustments in 1994-1995. Price controls remain 
only for bread, utilities and public transportation.” 
 
EBRD Structural Change Data 
 
Year 
Number Of Goods 
with Administered 
Prices (out of 15) 
EBRD Price 
Liberalization Index 
1989 15 1 
1990 15 1 
1991 15 1 
1992 9 1 
1993 9 1 
1994 9 2.7 
1995 5 3.7 
1996 3 3.7 
1997 3 4 
1998 3 4 
1999 3 4 
2000 3 4 
2001 3 4 
2002 3 4 
2003 6 4 
2004 6 4 
2005 6 4 
2006 5 4 
2007 5 4 
 
Available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
 
Belarus 
 
1994  “Producer prices liberalised in 1992, but ceilings on profit margins were put in 
place.”  
1995 “Large share of producer goods were liberalised since 1992, however ceilings 
on retail margins were introduced but these have since been removed. IMF 
agreements see most prices liberalised in 1994-1995.” 
1996  “Large number liberalized in early 1991, process of price liberalization 
completed in early 1995, though some controls still apply to bread and other food.” 
 
EBRD Structural Change Data 
Year 
Number Of Goods 
with Administered 
Prices (out of 15) 
EBRD Price 
Liberalization Index 
1989 15 1 
1990 15 1 
1991 6 1 
1992 6 2.3 
1993 6 2.3 
1994 6 2.7 
1995 6 3.7 
1996 6 3.7 
1997 6 4 
1998 6 2.7 
1999 6 2.3 
2000 6 2.3 
2001 6 2.7 
2002 6 2.7 
2003 4 2.7 
2004 5 2.7 
2005 6 2.7 
2006 6 2.7 
 26
 27
2007 7 2.7 
 
Available at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
 
 
Web Appendix 3. Representative Residual versus Predictor Plot, Small-Scale 
Privatization 
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